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Abstract 
 In India, caste-based discrimination is constitutionally prohibited. Among western 
nations with large Indian populations, however, not one has implemented a law prohibiting caste 
discrimination. This thesis examines the reasons that Members of Parliament (MPs) in the United 
Kingdom supported, or declined to support, a movement to prohibit caste discrimination in law. 
When politicians discussed legislation to prohibit caste discrimination in 2012 and 2013, the 
Indian community was split on the issue; the Hindu lobby rallied fiercely against it, even as low-
caste advocacy groups pushed it forward. Language outlawing caste discrimination was 
provisionally passed in 2013 but not implemented, as of 2017. The central debates on the issue 
have come to be seen as a landmark case study on caste legislation outside of India. Despite this 
attention, how average citizens stood on the issue—and why MPs mobilized—remained opaque.  
This study serves a twofold purpose. The first is to determine the demographic and 
political factors that influenced Members of Parliament to vocally support caste legislation. I 
examine whether the percent of Indians in a constituency, the MP’s ethnicity, or Labour party 
identification is the strongest predictor of vocal support. Vocal support is advocacy for the caste 
legislation movement, expressed through signing an Early Day Motion or advocating for 
legislation through debate. I also examine voting patterns in a 2013 Lords amendment to add 
caste to the 2010 Equality Act. The second goal of the study is to lay the groundwork for future 
research into how and if Western nations interpret and legislate against discrimination on the 
basis of sub-ethnic groups. I find that the percentage of Indian constituents an MP has is the 
single strongest influence on an MP’s probability of strongly supporting the caste legislation 
movement. Representing a constituency in the top decile of Indian population increased MPs’ 
probability of vocal support twofold from the mean.  
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Introduction 
Caste identity is a complicated social and ethnic identity which has roots that run deeply 
through Indian and broader South Asian history. The tangled origin of caste names lies partially 
in Hindu belief systems, though many argue that the caste system only morphed into a socially 
rigid hierarchy through British colonial rule. No matter the origins of caste, however, this 
stratified, socio-ethnic identity has been sometimes used as justification for social and political 
discrimination in India in its modern history. To help remedy this, India’s constitution 
fundamentally prohibits caste-based discrimination (Constitution of India 2011). Political 
scientists studying Indian politics widely treat caste as a salient political identity, analyzing 
voting trends by caste and party identification; there is a rich literature on the influence of caste 
on political identification and engagement throughout India (Jaffrelot 2011, 57). What we lack, 
though, is an investigation of how caste identity influences politics outside of India—if it does so 
at all. Further, there have been few studies on the possibility of passing caste non-discrimination 
laws in Western nations with large Indian populations. In this thesis, therefore, I investigate this 
question: How does a western, liberal democratic system address caste identity?  
Caste may provide a conundrum for western, liberal democracies. Most of these liberal 
democracies theoretically promise equality under the law, regardless of racial, sexual, ethnic, 
religious, or gender identity. The United Kingdom and the United States, for instance, each has 
passed dozens of non-discrimination laws on race, sex, age, sexual orientation in the last century 
(Pyper 2010). The United Kingdom contains one of the largest, most diverse Indian communities 
in the West, with an estimated 250,000-500,000 South Asians belonging to lower castes, broadly 
categorized as “Dalit” (Borbas et al. 2006, 4). When some of these low-caste Indians in the 
United Kingdom publicly argued in the 2000s that they experienced social or employment 
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discrimination because of their caste, there were murmurs of including caste in the UK’s 
Equality Act 2010; when activist networks began to work closely with the Labour Party before 
the revisions to the Equality Act in 2013, the debate broke out in full. Some Hindu temples and 
religious organizations vigorously opposed the measure, expressing concern that the law would 
be a reason for the white UK majority to control their religious activities—which might include 
temple hiring decisions influenced by caste. After much discussion, the House of Commons 
voted against a House of Lords’ amendment to the changes in the Equality Act 2010 that would 
include caste as a kind of discrimination. They voted this down as a part of a larger cluster of 
Lords’ revisions that they rejected. Just one week later, the Speaker of the House and an 
Equalities Minister decided to table this legislation and instead determined that a Minister of the 
Crown may implement the amendment whenever a full consultation on caste had been 
completed.  
Essentially, years after the debate over caste legislation in the Equality Act 2010, this 
amendment has been signed into law but not implemented. The power of implementation lies 
with government ministers, and they have not put it in place. Though the spokespeople for the 
advocacy groups on each side of the debate are routinely interviewed in the media coverage of 
the issue, there has been little analysis of what motivated Members of Parliament to support this 
movement or oppose it and to what degree. This thesis examines precisely these dynamics.  
The United Kingdom is, presumably, a liberal western democracy that in theory is bound to 
uphold the human rights and equality of every resident of that nation. If the majority of the UK 
believes that no one should be allowed to discriminate based on caste, then is it justifiable for the 
government to simply prohibit caste discrimination? Under liberal democratic principles, does it 
matter at all whether or not the Indian minority—the only affected group—agrees on the 
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definitions of equality? The answers to these questions are not clearly dictated by any liberal 
democratic theory. They have become more complicated as minority groups that contain a braod 
socioeconomic spectrum (or internal diversity) assimilate and become an integral part of western 
democratic systems. And so this case is not a niche issue about one minority group in one 
western European nation. Rather, the debate over caste legislation in the UK captures the 
fundamental question of what a majority group can dictate for a minority group in a liberal 
democratic nation. This case is all the more fascinating because it raises so many legitimate 
“rights” questions, and whether it is liberal—or ethical—for a majority to determine the terms of 
social equality on a minority community. If not, who within a minority group can decide what 
discrimination is, in its own social contract: the minority community’s elites, the community’s 
most vulnerable, or a majority? I believe that recognizing intersectional theories of race and 
gender should also lead political science scholars to interrogate their understandings of how 
ethnic minority groups assimilate.   
This particular project aims to capture a piece of this through studying the caste legislation 
issue. It sets out to understand whether MPs decided their stance based off of representation of 
their Indian constituents, based on their own ethnicity, or based on their party identification. If 
this study can examine what principally predicted support of the movement for caste 
discrimination legislation, then it will be much easier to parse the ways that caste issues affect 
and mobilize communities politically. Further, if there is any evidence that the demographics of a 
district motivate an MP’s decision, then the movement for caste legislation can be analyzed as a 
mobilization of an ethnic group or community. Any findings that swayed from the commonly 
accepted narrative—that most Hindu and Sikh Indian Britons opposed caste legislation—would 
offer insight into the more complicated underpinnings of caste’s role in the UK.  
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Specifically, in this thesis I use data gathered from parliamentary records and the UK 2011 
Census to investigate what demographic or party identifiers predict an MP’s vocal support for 
the caste legislation movement in the House of Commons. The study attempts to determine 
whether any particular ethnic constituency composition, religious constituency composition, 
place-of-origin constituency composition, MP’s ethnicity, or party identification can predict 
whether or not an MP will support caste legislation, holding other demographic factors constant. 
I consulted an array of public parliamentary documents and debates to assemble an original 
database on MP’s stances on caste legislation. This study examines all Early Day Motions and 
debate records with “caste” in their headings to operationalize “Vocal Support” and uses the 
voting record on the Enterprise and Regulatory Reform Act 2013 to operationalize “Lords 
Amendment Support” (UK Parliament Website: Parliamentary Business 2010-2015).  
Compiling these indicators of support with ethnic, religious, and place-of-origin data from 
the UK Census 2011, aggregated on the constituency level, and data on MPs’ ethnicity, I use 
logit models to identify predictive factors for support based on two levels. On the first level, 
“Vocal Support,” I examine which MPs were compelled to explicit support of the caste 
legislation movement. In this category, I include any MP that signed Early Morning Motions to 
bring attention to the caste legislation issue, or who spoke in a debate in the House of Commons 
positively about a need for caste legislation. For the second level of support, “Lords Amendment 
Support,” I include all MPs that voted in accordance with the 2013 proposed amendment to add 
caste to the Equality Act 2010. 
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History of Caste 
 
A. Caste in India  
Caste identity has played an influential role in the social and political actions of citizens 
in India’s democracy, influencing everything from community formation to modern partisanship. 
Since the concept of varna—the four traditional classes of ancient Indian society—developed in 
ancient Vedic societies, these categories have informed Indian social organization and political 
makeup even in the modern era. The conception of caste (jati), which encompasses the idea of 
thousands of individual communities within Indian society, in all four spiritual varna, rose out of 
these Vedic societies. Together, these two concepts have been loosely translated as “caste,” and 
have informed the contemporary understanding of the social stratification of Indian society 
(Bayly 1999). 
Caste has been historically associated with the Hindu religion; the social divisions loosely 
have their roots in Hinduism’s spiritual categories. During the British Raj, however, British 
colonial powers in South Asia cemented and formalized caste as a formal socio-ethnic identity 
(Dirks 2001). In 1901, this stratification gained formal political implications as the British Raj 
conducted the first thorough census of the subcontinent and cemented individuals’ caste 
identities, which otherwise were sometimes fluid. Throughout the remainder of the British Raj, 
the colonial powers distributed political power and occupations to Indians on the basis of their 
interpretation of caste identity. The colonial government also legitimized “untouchability 
practices” against members of the Dalit caste—the individuals classified at a lower level and 
outside of the varna classification entirely. Though caste identification carried political 
implications in traditional Indian history, it was only throughout the colonial period that these 
became both inflexible and political ethnic markers. Though I recognize that caste is an 
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important social factor in other South Asian communities besides India, I largely focus on the 
Indian diaspora in this thesis due to its explicitly political history in Indian democracy and the 
size of the Indian Diaspora. 
Today, caste is widely recognized within India as both a politicized ethnic identity as 
well as a fairly rigid social identity. The Indian Constitution now grants formal reservation of 
seats in Parliament for Scheduled Tribes and Scheduled Castes, dividing democratic political 
representation along clear caste-based lines (Constitution of India 2011). Part III of the Indian 
Constitution also prohibits “discrimination on grounds of religion, race, caste, sex or place of 
birth” (Constitution of India 2011). Broadly, caste identities can be divided into two groups: 
individuals from a caste within the caste system, and Dalits, also known as Scheduled 
Tribe/Scheduled Caste (SC/ST), from the group formerly called “Untouchable.” In this thesis, I 
use the term “low-caste” to designate people that are not from one of the traditional castes, but 
instead belong to a variety of historically marginalized, largely Dalit groups in the Indian 
Diaspora.  
B. Caste in the United Kingdom 
The population of people of Indian origin living within the United Kingdom is one of the 
only truly caste-diverse populations of people living outside of India; it is the closest nation in 
the Indian Diaspora to even roughly approximate an equivalent level of caste diversity as in India 
itself. The UK is estimated to hold a population of Dalits between 250,000 and 500,000 people 
out of an Indian population in the UK of over 1.4 million (Borbas et al. 2006, 4). This relatively 
large population springs from the mass migrations of many Indians of all socio-ethnic 
backgrounds from the subcontinent to the United Kingdom in the 1950’s and 1960’s during post-
colonization. An increasingly vocal British Dalit population in the late 1990’s and early 2000’s 
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began to complain of experiencing workplace harassment in the UK on the basis of their caste, 
mostly with complaints against higher-caste Indian coworkers. Those that experienced this 
discrimination, they argued, faced institutional roadblocks to reporting their complaint in official 
employment tribunals. Caste was not clearly interpreted as a kind of race in the UK, and there 
was no law prohibiting discrimination based on caste (Dhanda et al. 2014).    
Dalit activists lobbied for caste to be included in the Equality Act 2010, an inclusive act 
seeking to unite all existing protections from discrimination and legal guarantees of equality, but 
it won little support (Pyper 2015, 4). The debate re-ignited in the 2012-13 UK Parliament, as it 
considered amendments to the 2010 Equality Act. The Hindu Forum of Britain, the Hindu 
Council UK, the Alliance of Hindu Organizations and the Council of Hindu Temples all opposed 
any kind of caste legislation (Neiyyar 2013). These Hindu organizations rallied together to argue 
that legislating on caste in the UK would create a problem that did not exist and would increase 
marginalization of the Hindu and Indian communities by the white, British majority. 
Specifically, the associations asserted that legislating on caste would stigmatize followers of the 
Hindu religion and pin a largely fabricated accusation of institutional bias on a historically 
oppressed minority community (Samani et al. 2017). On the other side, low-caste (Dalit) 
advocates argued that caste discrimination does not disappear from society when people of South 
Asian origin leave the subcontinent. Framing the issue as a no-cost advance for civil liberties for 
minority Britons, they painted caste legislation as an issue of general social equality under liberal 
ideals rather than a niche minority issue.  
The majority of these debates have been focused in the 2010-2015 Parliament. After 
multiple debates on the issue in 2012 and 2013, and a few “Early Day Motions” to call for caste 
legislation, the House of Commons voted on one piece of legislation that would prohibit caste 
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discrimination in April 2013 through the Enterprise and Regulatory Reform Act 2013 (Enterprise 
and Regulatory Reform Act 2013). Advised by the House of Lords to add caste as a subsection 
of “race” in the Equality Act 2010, the House of Commons voted against adding caste to the bill, 
voting down the Lords’ suggested Amendment 37 of the Enterprise and Regulatory Reform Act 
2013. Party leaders offered their stances before the vote, with the Conservative Party largely in 
opposition and the Labour Party and Liberal Democrats voicing support.  
This single vote, however, is by no means the most reliable indicator of MPs’ individual 
stances on the movement, as a whole, for caste legislation. The House of Commons debated the 
caste legislation amendment in a series of votes on other Lords’ amendments to the Enterprise 
and Regulatory Reform Act. Likewise, some MPs were under the impression that there would be 
other opportunities to vote on caste legislation soon after; the issue was framed in a larger series 
of Commons disagreements with the House of Lords. In opposition to the House of Lords, the 
House of Commons voted against each of these four proposed amendments, including caste 
discrimination language. The votes fell into a similar pattern as the other three amendments on 
equalities law decided that day, with 307 MPs disagreeing with the Lords’ Amendment 37 and 
243 MPs in agreement. These consecutive votes on April 16, 2013, fell largely along party lines, 
as Conservatives disagreed with the Lords’ Amendments in droves. Further, debate transcripts 
reveal that even some of the MPs that led the caste legislation movement were “confused” about 
the amendment, as pro-caste legislation campaigner Richard Fuller expressed in the April 16 
debates (“Daily Hansard - Westminster Hall, 16 April 2013”).   
On April 23, just one week after the vote on the Lords’ amendment, the Speaker tabled the 
decision on the amendment and brought it back for debate. Jo Swinson, Business Minister, 
proposed to the House of Commons that they provisionally approve the Lords’ amendment to 
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add caste as an addition to the clause on race in the Equality Act 2010 but delay implementing 
the provision. The government leadership decided to move forward and determined that adding 
caste would be delayed until the Equality and Human Rights Commission could conduct a 
thorough investigation on the prevalence of caste discrimination, with an order that it be 
implemented within five years of passage.  
Essentially, this instruction binds the government to outlaw caste discrimination within five 
years of April 2013, contingent on the results of reports from the Equality and Human Rights 
Commission. This solution relies on a “Minister of the Crown” to trigger the provision into law. 
As of 2017, the government has not presented full reports on caste discrimination, and the law 
has not been put into place. The slow progress on this issue has angered activists who expected 
to see the law in place. Alternatively, the slow progress in implementation has largely has 
satisfied the Hindu coalition, which some believe to be involved in lobbying the Conservative 
government for continued delays. 
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Literature Review & Theoretical Model 
This section will detail the hypotheses and theoretical model, and the literature used to 
formulate each, that I use to test the reasons that UK Members of Parliament decided to vocally 
support caste legislation between 2010 and 2015. 
A. Previous Literature 
These hypotheses treat caste like a fairly fixed socio-political identity, rather than as a 
spiritual or religious factor (Dirks 2001, Bayly 1999). This assessment is based on histories 
detailing many centuries of British rule, in which colonial powers served to cement caste as both 
a political and ethnic identity. It also rests on a body of scholarship that has investigated the 
evolution of caste into a rigid ethnic identity over time (Balagangadhara 2010). Likewise, I draw 
from the theory established in Jaffrelot 2011 that there is a quantifiable link between voting 
patterns and caste identity in India (Jaffrelot 2011). Katti 2015 also established evidence of low-
caste Indians seeking caste representation in politics, demonstrating a solid link between caste 
identity and representation in a democratic system (Katti 2015, Shah 2004).   
Where my research diverges fairly sharply from these accounts is that I attempt to test 
these foundational theories of caste in the Indian Diaspora. In the Diaspora, the topic of caste has 
been largely left to sociologists rather than political scientists (Dirks 2001). Few political 
scientists have examined whether, or how, caste affects Indians in the Diaspora. I hope to test 
general theories of representation and identity politics through my hypotheses, bringing caste in 
the Diaspora into a political science framework. Though racial identity in many diasporas has 
been rigorously examined in the politics of their host countries, and caste politics have been 
extensively studied in India, few have studied the incorporation of caste-based ethnic identities 
into other political systems. Broadly, there has been hardly any attention given to whether sub-
 
Stotesbery 14 
ethnic identities within immigrant communities remain socially and politically salient in the 
political system of the Western nation. And just as caste has not been recognized as a political 
identity in the Diaspora, it likewise has not been thoroughly studied as a basis for social 
discrimination in Western democracies. I attempt to examine how the United Kingdom’s robust 
legal promises of equality are politically interpreted in the context of caste.  
The research methodology of this paper is rooted in the examples of using logistic 
regressions to examine voting patterns by Kahane 1996 and Kaempfer and Marks 1993. Both of 
these works estimated voting patterns in Congress over trade deals using logit and probit models 
(Kahane 1996). Tzelgov 2013 provides a compelling research design that uses both voting and 
rhetorical data in a logit model, systematically drawing both into a model of MPs’ stances on 
European integration (Tzelgov 2013). Eggers and Spirling 2014 uses a multinomial logit model 
to analyze House of Commons debates, parsing the relationship between strength of the 
government’s agenda-setting power and the opposition party’s arguments. I rely on this literature 
to design this study and to interpret its results.  
B. Research Question: 
 The debates over caste legislation in the United Kingdom played out in the British media 
landscape, with conflicting accounts of the proposed amendment to the Equality Act and 
considerable confusion about the coalitions of support and opposition. Though other EU nations 
watched the UK caste debate closely as a roadmap for debates on caste legislation, no clear 
narrative of the coalitions emerged in popular media. Both because of this opacity, and because 
of the critical importance of caste legislation to liberal democratic rights, I investigate: What 
factors predict Members of Parliaments’ support for caste legislation?  
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C. Hypotheses: Predictors of Support 
The narrative of prominent Hindu groups, and reflected in much of the media coverage, 
asserted that the majority of Indian constituents oppose caste legislation and that it was only a 
fringe group of minority Dalits that supported legislating on the basis of caste. However, for my 
first hypothesis I posit that this narrative might not reflect the actual patterns of popular support. 
This hypothesis first hinges on a premise that MPs, as elected representatives, are responsive and 
aware of the attitudes of those that they represent in the House of Commons. Under the dynamic 
representation theory for American politics constructed by Stimson et al. 1995, both public 
opinion and election outcomes have a direct effect on the public policy decisions of 
representatives (Stimson et al. 1995, 560). This hypothesis borrows that theoretical assumption 
from American politics and applies it to the British representational system; here, I assume that 
the attitudes of the constituents in districts will influence the voting patterns of their MPs and 
influence support. Thus if there is an issue supported deeply by a large subsection of an MP’s 
voters, they are likely to advocate for this cause.  
Further, this first hypothesis conceptualizes that the dominant narrative about the 
attitudes of Indian Britons may be incorrect. Operating from the theory of intersectionality 
proposed in Crenshaw 1991, this hypothesis proposes caste as a type of identity that exists at the 
intersection of social hierarchy and status as an ethnic minority, leading to twofold social 
vulnerability for this group (Crenshaw 1991). In this schema, it is possible for a low-caste person 
of Indian origin to be essentially a double minority. Crenshaw notes that “ignoring differences 
within groups frequently contributes to tension among groups”; this could apply to the way that 
the British, white majority fails to adequately recognize caste as a social factor within the Indian 
minority (Crenshaw 1991, 1). However, this theory presents the possibility that caste operates in 
 
Stotesbery 16 
intersection with one’s identity as an Indian minority. Thus, allies in the broader Indian 
community, who might have witnessed instances of caste discrimination firsthand but condemn 
it ideologically, could be well positioned to support the movement to legislate against caste 
discrimination. As individuals more likely than most Britons to identify and recognize caste 
discrimination when it occurs, they also may be the British community most aware of the issue. 
Further, there is no reliable estimate of the low-caste population in the United Kingdom; recent 
estimates place it somewhere between 250,000 and 500,000, out of a total of more than 1.4 
million people of Indian origin, and it is very possible that the population is larger than estimated 
(Borbas et al. 2006).  
With this strong of a coalition of low-caste Indians in the overall Indian population, and a 
strong possibility of some upper-caste Indian allyship with this division, it is possible that 
constituencies with a large number of Indians could actually be associated with a higher 
likelihood of their MP supporting caste legislation. In the pattern I propose for the first 
hypothesis, a Member of Parliament is more likely to support caste legislation if the member 
comes from a district with a proportionally high number of Indian constituents. This would assert 
that the single strongest predictor of support for caste legislation in the United Kingdom is the 
percentage of Indian constituents in a Member of Parliament’s district. This is detailed in the 
following formal hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 1 (H1): A high Indian population in a constituency is the single most 
significant, largest determinant of an MP’s vocal support; MPs whose constituencies hold 
high Indian populations will be the most likely to support caste legislation, controlling for 
other relevant demographic, party, and ethnic identity factors. 
I have also formulated two rival hypotheses. The second hypothesis asserts that the 
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ethnicity of the Member of Parliament herself could outweigh the influence of a district’s 
demographics. I formulate this theory based on identity politics scholarship that theorizes that a 
politician from a particular ethnic or racial group is most likely to act on the interests of that 
group (Tatari et al. 2015). Based on the work of Stokes and Miller 1963, and its contrast of 
substantive and descriptive representation, I further consider evidence from Indian politics that 
this desire for representation is strongest when caste is a political issue at hand (Katti 2015). In 
this schema, I treat South Asian legislators as most likely to advocate on behalf of the low-caste 
minority community; here, I consider constituents’ low-caste status as a subsection of their status 
as an ethnic minority in the broad “South Asian” category. South Asian legislators are, under 
Stokes and Miller’s framework, the most well-equipped to represent the interests and needs of 
even the most vulnerable in their ethnic community (Stokes and Miller 1963). Thus, theorizing 
that minority MPs—and particularly South Asian MPs—could be most likely to support caste 
legislation, I propose H2:  
Hypothesis 2 (H2): An MP’s ethnicity is the single most significant, strongest 
determinant of an MP’s vocal support; Members of Parliament who are minorities or are 
South Asian are most likely to support caste legislation, controlling for other relevant 
demographic, party, and ethnic identity factors. 
To develop my third rival hypothesis, I draw from both the Labour Party’s rhetorical 
narrative on the caste issue and the rhetoric of the Hindu organization leaders. With Jeremy 
Corbyn allied directly with the Dalit Solidarity Network, many Labour politicians who spoke in 
the House of Commons referenced their party itself as in support of caste legislation (UK 
Parliament Website: Parliamentary Business 2013). This third hypothesis simply draws from a 
theory that the Labour Party may have worked as the primary mouthpiece for a niche issue, and 
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so Labour Party identification would be most salient. In the narrative supported by Hindu activist 
groups, the movement to secure caste legislation was directed by a small minority of Indians and 
a coalition of well-intentioned, but misguided, white Labour Britons. The third hypothesis 
formalizes this theory that Labour functioned as an amplifying ally of the Dalit campaign. This 
hypothesis presents Labour as a very effective vessel of substantive representation (Stokes and 
Miller 1963). To theorize that party could be the most probable determinant of an MP’s support, 
I formulated H3: 
Hypothesis 3 (H3): Labour Party identification is the single most significant, strongest 
determinant of an MP’s vocal support; Members of Parliament who are members of the 
Labour Party are most likely to support caste legislation, controlling for other relevant 
demographic, party, and ethnic identity factors. 
In my quantitative analysis, I test the first hypotheses against these two rival hypotheses 
and use religion, place of origin, and other racial composition factors as control variables. The 
way this study operationalizes these hypotheses are further detailed in the “Methods” section. 
Crucially, I am primarily testing the ways that these demographic factors affect an MP’s 
motivations to join the movement of support for caste legislation, expressed through explicit 
support for the issue. Because of this, each hypothesis directly tests for the effects of the 
independent variables on the likelihood of vocal support, the details of which are explained in the 
“Methods” section below. However, to add a dimension of clarity to the decisions for support in 
a sometimes cloudy Westminster parliamentary system, I have also run two other logit models. 
One of these tests the effect of these factors on the Lords Amendment 37, which included caste 
legislation but was included as a part of a larger set of partisan bills in conflict with the House of 
Lords.  
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I choose to focus on vocal support rather than on this particular vote because I am most 
interested in what motivates an MP to take up the caste legislation cause—to turn them into an 
activist of sorts for caste legislation. The question of motivation is most applicable in examining 
the patterns among MPs who have chosen to vocally advocate for the issue, rather than just in 
examining the voting record from a minor proposed amendment, which had its decision reversed 
the next week by the government. This model can still provide fascinating insights, and I analyze 
it in the second model, but it is not an effective proxy on its own for overall MP support for the 
caste legislation movement. The third model examines the very few MPs who expressed vocal 
opposition, testing the effect of these same independent variables on that outcome. Despite the 
added explanations that these other two models offer, the “Vocal Support” model is the primary 
method to test these three hypotheses.  
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Methods 
 To test my hypotheses, I conduct a multivariate statistical analysis on the voting records 
of UK Members of Parliament from 2010-2015. Data aggregation efforts were crucial to this 
project; because of the unique research question in this project, I assembled an original dataset. 
Examining every parliamentary point of debate with the word “caste” in it, as well as every Early 
Day Motion and every piece of legislation filed with the word “caste,” I coded every piece of 
parliamentary activity that related to caste legislation according to the categories detailed below 
in this section. I also coded for the ethnicity of MPs in the 2010- 2015, combining this data with 
the Nomis dataset of district-level demographics. I corrected discrepancies between datasets, and 
accommodated for special elections, individually in my coding. The dataset I created includes 
every constituency in England and Wales, with the name of its corresponding MP, her party, her 
ethnicity, and the racial, religious, and nation-of-origin information about her constituents. 
I employ a logit regression model to test the probability of an MP’s support through the 
“Vocal Support” variable. I explore the reasons for an MP’s support further by examining “Lords 
Amendment Support,” to caste legislation. To add some dimensions of clarity to these results, I 
also conduct a logit regression to compare the probability of “Vocal Opposition,” a category 
reserved for the MPs who chose to speak in debates against caste legislation, or who signed 
Early Day Motions opposing their consideration. I choose to use logit regression models because 
my central outcome variables, vocal support of the caste legislation movement and support for 
Lords Amendment 37, are dichotomous. Logit models also treat all independent variables like 
risk factors that affect the probability of a successful outcome; this is an apt way to treat my 
independent variables, because this theoretical model is designed to test the way each of these 
lowers or raises risk of success. Some of my independent variables are continuous and others are 
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independent. By using this logit model, I am able to test the probability of an MP’s support if it 
is defined by one demographic, identity or party factor, holding all other variables equal.   
A. Data Sources  
I constructed my own dataset on the United Kingdom’s 650 Members of Parliament, their 
constituency, party, stances on caste legislation, and their ethnicity. I used a list of 2010 
officeholders downloaded from the UK Neighbourhood Statistics database (Office for National 
Statistics 2015). To account well for Members of Parliament who were elected in the middle of 
the term due to a death or other issue, I treated any vote, oration or signature submitted by any 
MP as representative of their constituency. If MPs were replaced mid-term, I coded the new 
MPs’ action as representative of the constituency just as would have been done for the original 
MP. This study relies on the digitized daily records of Parliamentary activity, the Daily Hansard, 
for all evaluations of Early Day Motions, votes, and oral debates (Daily Hansard). To gather data 
on minority and South Asian Members of Parliament, I based my estimations off of briefing 
papers from the House of Commons Library, specifically “Ethnic Minorities in Politics and 
Public Life” (House of Commons Library 2016). I cross-referenced the report from 2016 with 
ones from past years to determine that the statistics were correct for the 2010-2015 Parliament. 
This uses South Asian as the ethnicity (including India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Maldives, 
Sri Lanka and Nepal), and so I follow that designation. My study also relies on 2011 UK Census 
data for all constituency-level demographic factors and uses the University of Durham’s Nomis 
dataset, which aggregates the ward-level results of the 2011 Census into constituency-level 
results (Nomis 2017). Because this dataset only covers England and Wales, my analysis was 
ultimately limited to examining the actions of MPs from England and Wales, excluding those 
from Northern Ireland and Scotland. The details of this are explained in the “Methodology” 
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subsection below. 
B. Outcome Variables Definitions  
To code MPs for my outcome variable of “Vocal Support,” “Lords Amendment Support” 
and “Opposition,” I used a mix of voting records and floor debates. The methods used to define 
each category are included below.   
Vocal Support 
The variable “vocal support” is the strongest level of support for the caste legislation 
movement. It captures the small number of MPs (less than ten) that spoke strongly in favor of the 
movement to legislate against caste discrimination and the more than 60 MPs from England and 
Wales who signed Early Day Motions. I define a debate in the House, as does Eggers and 
Spirling 2014 in their assessment of UK Parliamentary debates, as “a generic term for a sequence 
of utterances pertaining to the same subject at a particular time as demarcated by parliamentary 
recorders…and includes open discussion, questions and answers, or other statements” (Eggers 
and Spirling 2014). Thus I examined all debates in the 2010-2015 Parliament that included 
“caste” in a subject title in the Daily Hansard database.  
 For “Vocal Support,” I primarily drew from the UK Parliamentary records on all Early 
Day Motions that included “caste” in the 2010-2015 Parliament; they stretched between 2010 
and 2013. The MPs that signed on to these initiatives, urging the House to act on caste 
legislation, indicated their vocal support for caste legislation through that act (UK Parliament 
Website: Parliamentary Business 2015). Additionally, I use the transcripts from each debate that 
occurred on the floor of the House of Commons concerning caste legislation from 2010 to 2015; 
each of these debate transcripts are sourced from the UK Parliament’s published records 
database, the Daily Hansard. The study examined all published transcripts from every debate in 
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the House of Commons concerning any caste legislation issue, between the dates of the 2010 and 
2015 elections (UK Parliament Website: Parliamentary Business 2015). I interpreted their 
arguments and coded “Vocal Support” if they expressed a clearly positive stance on caste 
legislation. If the MP used the expressly positive language of “needing” caste legislation, drew in 
an argument for caste legislation on the basis of “equality” or “fairness,” the study includes them 
in the “Vocal Support” category. There are only three MPs who were classified in “Vocal 
Support” purely based off of their debates; the rest of those who spoke in support on the floor 
also signed Early Day Motions. 
This study uses these parameters for “Support” for caste legislation: If an MP signed an 
Early Day Motion calling for caste legislation or spoke explicitly in favor of caste legislation in 
the UK during oral statements, I coded that Member of Parliament as a “1” for support. 
“Support” was therefore limited to the short list of those who took to the House floor to vocalize 
direct support for the movement to include caste legislation and those that signed motions 
explicitly in support of caste legislation. Only six MPs from England and Wales were coded for 
support solely on the basis of their oral arguments; almost all those who spoke on the floor also 
signed Early Day Motions. 
Vocal Opposition 
I followed the same process and the same criteria as detailed above for the very small 
number that vocally opposed caste discrimination, to form the category “Vocal Opposition.” I 
only included an MP in the “Vocal Opposition” category (coded a “1” for “Vocal Opposition”) if 
she or he had signed an early day motion explicitly opposing caste legislation, or if he or she had 
spoken against caste legislation, as a whole, in parliamentary debate. There were only three MPs 
coded for opposition purely on the basis of their oral arguments. 
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Lords Amendment Support   
For the third category, “Lords Amendment Support,” I included all MPs, restricted to 
England and Wales, who voted in favor of the Lords’ Amendment 37 to the Enterprise and 
Regulatory Reform Act. Incorporating the 190 of these MPs that voted for the amendment from 
England and Wales into my dataset, I relied on the Parliamentary record of the debate and full 
voting list of “Noes” and “Ayes” (“Daily Hansard - Westminster Hall, 16 April 2013”).  
C. Methodology 
 I compiled these outcome variables, categorized by constituency, into one dataset 
alongside constituency-level data gathered in the UK census 2011 on the ethnicity, race, religion, 
country of origin, and other demographic factors of constituents (UK Parliament Website: 
Parliamentary Business 2015). Each of these continuous, independent variables is detailed in 
Table 2. Because the census data was collected at the ward level, the UK government releases no 
comprehensive dataset with ethnic information downloadable by constituency. To use 
constituency-level data, I relied partially on the work of Durham University researchers, through 
their data archive called Nomis. Through that project, they have aggregated ward-level census 
data into constituencies (Nomis 2017). I incorporated their constituency-level demographic data 
into my dataset.  
Though the work of these researchers was invaluable to my aggregation process, one 
limitation is that the ethnic data I’ve collected is only for England and Wales; this data excludes 
constituencies in Scotland and Northern Ireland. Thus my results are based off of the patterns of 
support among MPs representing England and Wales, and so my results are necessarily limited 
in scope to that area. There have been no regional coalitions in the political debates over caste 
legislation in the UK, and so I have no reason to believe that this omission significantly biases 
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my sample. Other than the exclusion of those areas, the Durham University dataset of census 
records uses incredibly reliable methods of ward aggregation; further, by relying on direct census 
data my sampling error is, hopefully, as small as it could conceivably be. I hope that drawing my 
constituent data directly from the last comprehensive government-issued census before the caste 
debates will ensure reliability of my results and ensure that the external validity of this study is 
very high. 
I test my three central hypotheses first in a comprehensive logit model to predict 
likelihood of “Vocal Support” for caste legislation, given one particular demographic or party 
factor and holding all others constant. I also ran logit models to predict voting patterns on the 
Lords Amendment 37 and to predict opposition to the law, to create points of comparison and to 
possibly elucidate the mechanisms of support. Though these two logit models are not central to 
my hypotheses, they provide an interesting point of comparison to the results of my tests for 
support. The descriptive statistics of these outcome variables is included in Table 1 below.  
Table 1. Outcome Dichotomous Variables 
Variable Observations 0 (No) 1 (Yes) 
Vocal Support  573 508 (88.66%) 65 (11.34%) 
Lords Amendment 
Support 
573 382 (66.67%) 191 (33.33%) 
Opposition 573 566 (98.72%) 7 (1.22%) 
 
 All variables on ethnicity and religion included in Table 2 are collected from the United 
Kingdom’s 2011 Census categories. I created variables summarizing the percent of the 
population identifying as each factor in every constituency. Respondents could choose only one 
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religious affiliation or “no religion,” and were able to choose from broad categories of 
ethnicity/race, including “white,” “mixed,” “Asian,” “Black” and “other” (Nomis 2017). Within 
these categories, there were multiple sub-categories; “Asian Indian” is one of the subcategories 
of “Asian.” Because my thesis seeks to compare determinants of support evenly across 
constituencies, I use the “percent” of a constituency demographics variables rather than total 
populations. To capture the proportional weight of different demographic considerations, I 
created variables for the percent of constituents that identify as each demographic, per 
constituency. I used the census data on the total number of individuals per constituency in each 
group and converted these into percentages per total population in each constituency. The 
descriptive statistics of these independent variables are detailed in Table 2 below.  
A notable limitation of my data is that this study only covers England and Wales, rather 
than the entire United Kingdom. The sample size for each of my demographic variables is 
n=573, rather than the full 650 constituencies in the UK, because the Nomis dataset has omitted 
Northern Ireland and Scotland. When deciding on the independent variables that I would use in 
my logit models, I was careful to avoid including variables that are highly correlated with one 
another in order to avoid collinearity. Although some demographic variables are inevitably 
associated with one another, like Hindu and Asian Indian, none are collinear.  
Table 2. Hypothesis 1 Descriptive Statistics (Continuous Variables) 
Variable Observations Mean Standard Dev. Minimum Maximum 
Percent Asian Indian 573 2.317 4.446 0.053 48.55 
Percent White 573 87.21 15.40 23.09 98.98 
Percent Hindu 573 1.321 2.300 0.022 31.96 
Percent Born Outside the 573 8.257 8.884 0.981 47.40 
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EU 
Percent Mixed Race 573 2.063 1.581 0.396 7.827 
Percent Muslim 573 4.332 7.251 0.107 52.12 
 
To define whether an MP was a minority, I relied on the definitions used in official 
parliamentary minority counts, like “Ethnic Minorities in Politics and Public Life” (House of 
Commons Library 2016). I used Parliament’s definitions of minority and South Asian to code 
these dichotomous variables as either a “1” or a “0.” Because much of my data relies on the 
Nomis dataset for these variables, which excludes Scotland and Northern Ireland, I use the same 
sample size in the sample size for my dichotomous variables, n=573, the full number of 
Members of Parliament from England and Wales.  
Table 3. Hypotheses 2 and 3 Descriptive Statistics (Dichotomous Variables)  
Variable Observations 0 (No) 1 (Yes) 
MP South Asian 573 559 (97.56%) 14 (2.44%) 
MP Minority 573 554 (96.68%) 19 (3.32%) 
Conservative MPs 573 270 (47.12%) 303 (52.88%) 
Labour MPs 573 355 (61.95%) 218 (38.05%) 
Liberal Democrat 573 526 (91.80%) 47 (8.20%) 
 
To test my hypotheses, I used STATA 14.0 to run three multivariate logit models, with 
“Vocal Support,” “Lords Amendment Support,” and “Opposition” as my three dependent 
variables for the models. The independent variables of demographics, parties, and MP 
characteristics remained the same in each model. I used these “percent” variables in the logit 
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model regression, next to the dichotomous independent variables described above. All “percent” 
variables fell between 0 and 100, and all dichotomous variables were coded either as 0 or as 1.  
However, a logit model’s coefficients cannot be used to determine probability, so I 
employ a post-estimation function after running the logit model to predict the probability of the 
outcome variable, comparing these outcomes to the overall probability of that outcome. To use 
post-estimations, I categorized constituent data as “Top 10%” and “Bottom 10%.” First, I predict 
“p,” or the raw probability of a positive outcome. Using the top 10% and bottom 10% 
proportions of each demographic group per constituency, I calculate the mean value of “p” if that 
variable is greater than the 90th percentile and the mean value if it is lower than the 10th 
percentile. I did this for each demographic variable, recording the means in Table 4 below. For 
each of the dichotomous independent variables, I estimated the mean probability if each of them 
were 1. I used the same post-estimation procedure to estimate the probability of a positive 
outcome for the “Oppose” outcome variable. Comparing this to the mean value of “p” lends an 
interpretation to how that variable affects the probability of each outcome variables. 
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Results 
 The results of my logistic regressions are recorded in the tables below. Table 4 details the 
mean probability that an MP, randomly chosen, would choose the outcome in each model. The 
probabilities for each model are sorted accordingly. Table 5 displays the results of the logistic 
regressions for each model. To understand the impact of an independent variable on the 
probability of success for the outcome variable, we compare the post-estimation result for each 
model in Table 5 with the overall mean value of P1, P2 or P3 in Table 4. For the demographic 
characteristics, comparing the results for the 10th percentile and below with those of the 90th 
percentile and above further reveals the depth of that difference.   
Table 4. Prediction Models Overview – Summary Statistics 
Variable Observations Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Minimum Maximum 
P1 (Vocal Support) 573 0.113 0.127 0.023 0.794 
P2 (Lords Am. Support) 573 0.333 0.391 0.006 0.987 
P3 (Vocal Opposition) 507 0.014 0.071 2.04e-12 0.974 
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Table 5. Logit Models Post-Estimation Results, by Model 
Variables Vocal Support 
Model 
 
Lords 
Amendment 
Support Model 
Vocal 
Opposition 
 
Percent Asian Indian (Top 10%) 0.251** 
(0.026) 
0.488 
(0.051) 
0.072* 
(0.028) 
Percent Asian Indian (Bottom 10%) 0.097** 
(0.0149) 
0.293 
(0.050) 
0.012* 
(0.001) 
Percent “Mixed Ethnicity” (Top 
10%) 
0.220 
(0.019) 
0.613 
(0.054) 
0.003* 
(0.003) 
Percent “Mixed Ethnicity” (Bottom 
10%) 
0.095 
(0.013) 
0.472 
(0.052) 
0.015* 
(0.001) 
Percent White (Top 10%) 0.061 
(0.018) 
0.550 
(0.266) 
0.022* 
(0.008) 
Percent White (Bottom 10%) 0.271 
(0.024) 
0.669 
(0.043) 
0.086* 
(0.030) 
Percent Born Outside EU (Top 10%) 0.219 
(0.022) 
0.616 
(0.049) 
0.079 
(0.030) 
Percent Born Outside EU (Bottom 
10%) 
0.095 
(0.012) 
0.654 
(0.043) 
0.011 
(0.001) 
Percent Hindu (Top 10%) 0.222 
(0.024) 
0.439 
(0.052) 
0.076 
(0.030) 
Percent Hindu (Bottom 10%) 0.090 
(0.013) 
0.291 
(0.050) 
0.013 
(0.001) 
Percent Muslim (Top 10%) 0.247 
(0.025) 
0.597 
(0.042) 
0.077 
(0.026) 
Percent Muslim (Bottom 10%) 0.078 
(0.012) 
0.235 
(0.047) 
0.012 
(0.001) 
MP - South Asian 0.357 
(0.066) 
0.429 
(0.102) 
Omitted 
MP - Minority 0.316 
(0.055) 
0.421 
(0.091) 
Omitted 
Labour 0.161* 
(0.008) 
0.817 
(0.007) 
0.019 
(0.006) 
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Liberal Democrat 0.319 
(0.010) 
0.064** 
(0.004) 
Omitted 
Conservative 0.040*** 
(0.002) 
0.020*** 
(0.000) 
0.010 
(0.003) 
Pseudo-R2 0.463 0.616 0.4636 
Log likelihood -19.82 -140.2 -19.82 
***p < .001, **p < .01, *p < .05. Standard Error is included in parentheses. 
 
Vocal Support Model - Results 
The results of the “Vocal Support” model provide the most revealing insight about the 
ways that demographics affected support for caste legislation. The logistic regression for the 
“Vocal Support” model shows three variables that produce statistically significant results at the 
α<0.05 level: the percent of Indian constituents in a Member of Parliament’s district, Labour 
Party identification, and Conservative Party identification.  
The results provide evidence that, holding an MP’s party and other demographic factors 
constant, a statistically significant factor in predicting support of caste legislation is the 
percentage of Indian constituents living in that district. Moreover, it complicates these results by 
also providing evidence that both Labour Party and Conservative Party identification also 
strongly affects the probability of vocal support. The overall mean probability for a Member of 
Parliament to support caste legislation was 0.113, meaning that there was an 11.3% chance that a 
randomly chosen MP would support caste legislation. The probability value for the “Bottom 10% 
Asian Indian” is 0.097, or 9.7%, meaning that the chance that an MP representing a district in the 
tenth percentile or below of Indian residents would vote for caste legislation is less than the 
overall average. The “Top 10% Asian Indian” probability is a full 0.251. For an MP representing 
a district that falls into the 90th percentile or above of Asian Indian residents, the probability that 
they will support caste legislation is 25.1%—a 13.8% increase from the overall average 
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probability of vocal support.  
Likewise, the results indicate that party plays a strong role as well. A Labour MP has a 
16.1% chance of vocally supporting the movement, at a 4.8% increase in likelihood from the 
overall mean. The likelihood that a Conservative MP will vocally support the caste legislation 
movement is 0.040, or 4.0%, which is a 7.3% decrease from the average. This could bolster the 
narrative that the Labour Party pushed to pass caste legislation and that the Conservative Party 
rallied on the side of the Hindu Forum, and could add evidence to Hypothesis 3 on the role of the 
Labour Party.  
These results were significant at a α level of 0.05, and so we can reject the null 
hypothesis that the proportion of a constituency that is of Indian origin has no effect on the 
likelihood of its MP to support caste legislation; we can do the same to reject the null hypothesis 
that Labour party identification has no effect. Though it is evident that party plays a role in 
determining vocal support, the change in likelihood of vocal support due to Labour identification 
was less significant than the change (13.8%) from the average to a high-Indian population 
district. The results indicate support for Hypothesis 1 (H1), stating that: Members of Parliament 
with high Indian populations would be the most likely to support caste legislation, controlling for 
other demographic and party factors. Our post-estimation means show that the probability of 
supporting caste legislation is more than twice as large when the constituency is in the top tenth 
percentile of Indian constituents than in tenth percentile or less of Indian constituents, or than the 
overall average probability of support.  
These results provided no statistically significant evidence that an MP’s ethnicity has any 
effect on their likelihood to support the caste legislation. It adds no weight to the second 
hypothesis, which asserted that an MP’s ethnicity would be the strongest predictor. Thus our 
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results indicate compelling evidence that, holding other demographic factors equal, an increased 
percentage of Indian constituents is the factor associated with the largest change in probability 
that an MP will vocally support the movement to legally prohibit caste-based discrimination in 
the United Kingdom.  
Lords Amendment Support Model – Results 
 The results from the Lords Amendment Support model reveal that this particular piece of 
legislation on caste was struck down largely by the Conservative party. When the issue was 
introduced in an amendment, voted on along with multiple other amendments and seen through 
the lens of disagreement or accordance with the House of Lords, the primary determinant of the 
vote was identifying with the Conservative Party. At the α level of 0.001, the likelihood of a 
Conservative MP to agree with the amendment was a mere 2%, compared with the average 
probability of 33.3% for all MPs. At a α level of 0.05, identifying with the Liberal Democrats 
party changed an MP’s likelihood of support for the amendment to 6.4%, from the overall 
average of 33.3%. Here, the way that this amendment followed the pattern of Conservative 
disagreement with the House of Lords’ amendments is clear, along with a mixed Labour reaction 
and stance. There is little evidence that the percent of Indian Britons in a district was a 
significant determinant of this particular vote. 
Crucially, Labour party identification is not a statistically significant determinant of 
support. This model does not provide evidence that party identification as a whole affected 
probability of support, only that identification as a Liberal Democrat or Conservative affected the 
probability of voting in favor of the Lords Amendment 37. Because Labour is one of the two 
largest political parties and was not a significant influence here—and is the critical factor in 
H3—these results would provide some peripheral support for H3, but no explicit support. The 
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“Discussion & Conclusion” section weighs these results alongside the results of the “Vocal 
Support” model and further discusses how to interpret this evidence.  
Vocal Opposition Model - Results 
Though it does not directly test this study’s central hypotheses, I calculated a logistic 
regression to examine the relationship between these same independent variables and the 
probability that an MP would actively oppose caste legislation through either oral arguments or 
signing a motion. This regression, though peripheral in some ways, helps shed light on the 
motivations for Members of Parliament to take a stance on this movement for caste legislation. 
Contrasting these probabilities to the results generated in the first two models could elucidate 
areas of division, or perhaps clarify the reasons that the other two models produce different 
results. As demonstrated above, the general probability that an MP will actively oppose caste 
legislation is 0.014, or 1.4%. The logit model produced multiple statistically significant results at 
the α<0.05 level; “Percent Asian Indian,” “Percent ‘Mixed Ethnicity’” and “Percent White” were 
proved to be statistically significant in this model. The sample size was reduced to 507, because 
the variables “MP Minority,” “MP South Asian,” and “Liberal Democrat” were omitted from the 
model because there were no MPs that opposed the movement in those categories, and so their 
inclusion would have predicted failure perfectly.  
The vocal opposition model offers some limited insights into the various determinants of 
an MP’s reasons to support or oppose the caste discrimination legislation. Though there were a 
relatively small number of MPs to vocally oppose the movement, it is notable that both 
Conservative and Labour MPs took a stance of vocal opposition. The results show that an MP 
with a high Indian constituency had a slightly higher chance of opposing the movement than 
ones with low Indian constituencies. Though this may seem to run counter to the results of the 
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Vocal Support model, the low number of opponents to the law (seven) makes generalizing 
unwise; any analysis generalizing these to broader patterns should be done without giving them 
too much weight.  
The most clarifying part of this model’s results is simply the conclusion that both Labour 
and Conservative MPs spoke in opposition to the law, showing that Labour is by no means 
united in support of caste discrimination legislation. This, coupled with the results in the Vocal 
Support Model and the Lords Amendment Support Model, indicate that there is no model that 
shows Labour as the most salient predictor of support. This model helps clarify the results of the 
“Vocal Support” model, showing the party divisions that weigh against Hypothesis 3.     
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Discussion & Conclusion 
The results of my “Vocal Support” model provide strong evidence that the percent of 
Indians in an MP’s constituency is the single strongest predictor of their vocal support for the 
movement to legislate on caste; this confirms Hypothesis 1. Though Labour party identification 
and Conservative party identification still held strong influences, their influence was not nearly 
as strong as the effect of “Percent Asian Indian” on the probability of vocal support. However, it 
is still notable that the Conservative Party was so staunchly anti-caste legislation throughout the 
regressions; this may reveal the strength of the Conservative Party’s partnership with the Hindu 
organizations, since the party pattern—for the Conservative Party alone—was so strong. 
Likewise, the comparative results of the vote on Amendment 37 indicate that the Conservative 
Party was uniquely mobilized against caste legislation, even as party identification failed to 
predict the stances of Labour politicians. These results as a whole compel me to reject the null 
hypothesis that the relationship between the proportion of Asian Indians in a district and the 
probability of that MP supporting caste discrimination are only randomly associated. Thus this 
quantitative analysis does not provide sufficient evidence to affirm either of the rival hypotheses 
presented in this thesis—that either party or an MP’s personal ethnic identity is the strongest 
predictor of vocal support.   
The connection that this study has found between Asian Indian communities in the UK 
and support for caste legislation certainly runs counter to the popular understanding of the caste 
legislation issue. During the debates on caste legislation, the National Council of Hindu Temples 
and the Hindu Forum spoke out aggressively against caste legislation, often rhetorically on 
behalf of Hindus or Indians in general. The chair of the National Council of Hindu Temples 
pinpointed the push for legislation on a “Hinduphobic” agenda that unfairly stigmatized the 
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Hindu community and the Asian Indian community at large (Samani et al. 2017). The narrative 
adopted in the media coverage was that the majority of Indian and Hindu organizations opposed 
caste legislation, and only a small minority of Indians, allied with Evangelical Christians, was in 
favor of legislation.  
The findings of this study certainly run counter to that narrative, as the evidence suggests 
that the percentage of Indian constituents in a constituency is the single most important influence 
on the probability of support, holding other demographic factors constant. This certainly supports 
the proposal behind the first hypothesis, which suggests that the issue of caste legislation is less a 
matter of overall equality measures and more an issue that particularly engages one minority part 
of the population: Asian Indians. Within this group, it is possible that either the Dalit influence is 
stronger than most assume, or that there are many in the Indian community that are both aware of 
and deeply opposed to caste discrimination. In either case, the community’s elites that lead 
religious organizations may not represent the Indian community at large. Thus the identity 
politics link that underpins that first hypothesis shows itself in this study, because the shared 
characteristic of large Indian populations serves as the most salient motivation for political 
action. The strength of the demographic factor—even over personal ethnic identity for an MP—
point to the strong representation granted in the UK for MPs and their constituents, along the 
lines of the Dynamic Representation model. Further, these results give less credence to the 
theory that underpins the second hypothesis; the ethnicity of Indian MPs, though descriptively 
representative of the Indian community, was not a significant factor in predicting vocal support.    
There is one element, however, that confounds the seemingly clear relationship between 
the percentage of a community that is Asian Indian (our independent variable) and its MP’s 
probability of vocally supporting caste legislation (our central outcome variable). The one un-
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measurable factor throughout this study is the actual caste identities of the Asian Indians living 
in these communities. While the result of this study, proving a strong connection between Indian 
communities in the UK and supporting caste legislation, is certainly a new proposition, this work  
leaves some questions unanswered. Namely, the comprehensive lack of data on the caste identity 
on Indian Britons throughout the UK presents a unique challenge to interpreting the mechanism 
behind these results. 
As this research stands now, caste is a hidden variable in my results that may be 
influencing this relationship between British Indian communities and support for caste 
legislation. Essentially, these results show that the British Indian community, as a whole, could 
be more inclined to the caste legislation issue than was realized, through the allyship theory, or 
there could be a much larger population of low-caste individuals in Britain than expected, which 
could influence the public perception of this issue. As mentioned before, there has been no 
comprehensive study of any kind on the number of Dalits living in the UK; it is currently 
estimated at 250,000, but that is a broad estimation not based in any census or any 
comprehensive survey results (Borbas et al. 2006). Though the results of this study challenge the 
common perception of caste legislation alliances, further investigation into the caste identities of 
British Indians will be needed to truly identify the mechanism behind this link—and to determine 
whether caste cleanly determines support, as a salient political identity.  
Since 2015, the Conservative government has kept caste legislation shelved until it 
finishes its research into caste discrimination. It would be beneficial for that research to conduct 
surveys to estimate the low-caste population; without concrete evidence of this demographic, the 
mechanisms behind this Indian link to supporting caste legislation may remain up for debate. If 
the UK government collected data on caste, it would be invaluable both to the quality of debates 
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on caste legislation in the future and to the public understanding of the caste issue in Britain.  
Regardless of the available information on caste, it is certainly telling that the MPs of 
high-density Indian districts would be more likely to take a public stand on caste legislation, all 
else held equal. If any further studies are conducted that gather caste data on UK residents, this 
study’s theoretical model could be easily replicated, using caste demographics in place of “Asian 
Indian” to test a more refined version of Hypothesis 1. The results of that test could disentangle 
the effect of a large low-caste Indian community from the effect of a large high-caste Indian 
community. For now, though, “Asian Indian” is the most specific variable possible, and these 
results clearly indicate an identity-based link in the caste legislation issue. These results suggest 
that the theoretical underpinnings of this project—asserting that caste identity and caste issues in 
the Diaspora follows established patterns of identity politics—seem to be confirmed in the 
patterns of support across the House of Commons.  
Though this study’s external validity is technically limited to the MPs that represent 
England and Wales, it provides an engaging hypothesis for legislating on the rights to non-
discrimination based on sub-ethnic identities, and other kinds of double minorities in Western 
democracies. Would a minority community that has any kind of internal social hierarchy be more 
open, in a Western democracy, to legislating for the rights of its historically stigmatized 
subgroup? Further research, applying this model to other political issues relevant to sub-ethnic 
identities in Western nations, could shine more light on the mechanisms behind my results and 
could test its generalizability to other “double minority” groups in Western democratic nations. 
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